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National minorities in the 21st century 
Europe: new discourses, new narratives? 
   
For centuries national minorities in Europe have lived in the shadow of the 
historical events of the 19th  and the 20t h  centuries. Whether for humanitarian 
reasons or to protect the identity of national minorities, major European treaties 
settling inter-state wars have had to address minority issues to secure the peace. 
For this reason, national minorities have frequently been seen not only as 
obstacles to nation and state building but also as anomalies in international 
relations.1 At times labelled as troublemakers and war mongers, national 
minorities have seldom been afforded ethical standing in the writing of Europe’s 
history.2 While the settlement after the First World War might be called an 
‘honourable’ settlement, the settlement after the Second World War basically 
erased some national minorities from the European map. The integration 
discourses of the 21st  Century seem to bring changes to this scenario.  
 
Discourses of integration and Europeanization 
promote de-territorialized politics at all levels, trans-
national, state and regions as well as cross-border. 
This means new non-nation state narratives for these 
areas and the people who populate them. New 
research shows that at the regional and cross-border 
levels, national minorities are engaged in regional 
politics.3 Discourses of integration and 
Europeanization promote development politics. This 
means new narratives of modernization and 
innovation for public and private actors alike. New 
research shows that national minorities have teamed 
up with public actors to design regional strategies for 
development. Discourses of integration and 
Europeanization promote democratic approaches. 
This means new narratives of inclusion for excluded 
groups. While national minorities have been excluded 
from the democratic processes for centuries, new 
research shows that partially as a result of the 
convergence of democratization and integration 
policies, national minorities are increasingly able to 
participate in the democratic process.4  
The research drawn upon in this Issue Brief is 
based on data compiled in the Danish-German border 
region in 2007. The national minorities in that region 
are informing current European discourses with 
narratives based on solidarity towards the emerging 
European polity, based on accumulation of social 
capital which allows them to perform acts of 
citizenship of relevance to European integration, and 
based on virtues of normative participation in 
environmental protection.5 In short, national minority 
narratives exhibiting moral commitments are 
increasingly articulated in European integration 
discourses.   
The discourses of relevance to national minority 
narratives in the 21st Century Europe are a direct 
outcome of the peace building and economic 
consolidation efforts begun in the 20th Century by the 
European Union (EU). With the economic and 
political integration processes having reached an 
intensive level at the end of the 1990s, the first 
decade of the 21st Century has seen the 
implementation of specific policies directed towards 
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specific problems and issues in the enlarged EU. 
Policies such as the Cohesion Policy, the Regional 
Policy and the Environment portfolio are policies 
aimed at European integration and development, each 
of which has taken on the aura of a discourse in the 
sense that many actors participate and articulate 
views as to how the policies should be designed and 
implemented.6 As the policies get moulded within the 
EU institutions and at the national level, the power 
struggles in these discourses get into play. 
Although national minority narratives are by no 
means a new phenomenon,7 it is only recently that 
these narratives have become the focus of political 
sociology research. The data from the Danish-
German border region thus provide a very different 
picture of national minorities as actors and 
participants in mainstream society. This is research 
that shows the ability of national minorities to show 
solidarity, accumulate social capital and apply virtues 
in the quest to protect the environments of their 
homelands.8 Thus, it could be contended that had 
research focused on these type of national minority 
narratives over the last couple of centuries, the 
sedimented views of national minorities might not 
have become so entrenched. There are therefore 
compelling reasons to redesign the research 
framework on national minorities.   
The focus of this Issue Brief is on national 
minorities understood as those minorities who live 
traditionally in a homeland territory from which they 
derive their identity as members of a certain nation. 
The homeland territory is usually situated in regions 
whose sovereign allegiance and belonging have been 
contested among competing national states. Often the 
territory has been contested through bellicose means 
thus rendering the national minorities of the region 
objects of wars and eventually of settlements. At 
times the settlements have resulted in transfer of 
sovereignty to new rulers, thus incurring a need for 
the minorities to change allegiance to the new rulers 
or flee the territory. It is for this reason that national 
minority issues became articulated in a security 
discourse and later, when democratic rights became 
implemented in Europe, in a justice discourse. In the 
20th Century these two discourses trapped national 
minorities in an Oriental narrative9 that did not serve 
them well and whose negative and patronizing 
articulations hold them hostage in the 21st Century. 
There is therefore a need (1) to map out the real 
national minority narratives of the 21st Century, and 
(2) to relate these to the new integration and 
Europeanization discourses which are gaining 
hegemonic positions in Europe. But first, a brief look 
at the old discourses that held minority narratives 
hostage to the Oriental view. 
Old European discourses  
 
From the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (2005), the securitization of 
minorities has been steady. Today, this security 
discourse is exemplified in the work of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
within the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). After the adoption of 
the United Nations’ (UN) Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (1948) a justice discourse developed 
which sought to protect members of national 
minorities as individual human rights holders. The 
hegemonic agent of this discourse is the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (1995) and the monitoring 
system thereto attached. In these discourses, the focus 
on national minorities has shifted from religious 
minorities to national minorities and very lately back 
to religious minorities. Throughout, minorities have 
been a hot political agenda item often situated at the 
top of the agenda for military and inter-state war 
settlements. Consequently, the existence of minorities 
was seen as threatening European security and peace. 
The events in the Balkans at the end of the 20th 
Century helped cement this view. As minorities were 
subjected to the ongoing power struggles of the day, 
the focus on security and later on justice was a 
natural but not necessarily a comprehensive 
approach. The next two sections focus on national 
minorities as objects of these two discourses.  
The security discourse 
 
Security in Europe is intrinsically linked to treaties 
and agreements settling inter-state conflicts and 
disputes. With the Peace of Augsburg (1555), 
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religious minorities became a bilateral issue in 
Europe.10 With the Peace of Westphalia (1648), they 
became an inter-state issue.11 With the Congress of 
Vienna (1815), the focus turned to national minorities 
as a multilateral issue in Europe.12 In the Peace of 
Paris (1919), national minorities became an 
international issue in Europe.13 This trend continued 
through the 20th Century until it became a supra-
national issue through the European Union’s 
Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and the subsequent 
accession of new member states to the Union from 
the former Soviet Bloc. Thus, the security discourse 
represents a binary relationship of war and peace. 
The notion that members of minorities are not 
supporters of peace because they think and act 
differently than the majority, that they need to be 
controlled because they are troublemakers or likely to 
become war mongers, is therefore a categorization 
that has been attached to minorities by the holders of 
power in conflicts but which for the most part was 
not a realistic description of minorities.14  
This view has lingered through till the end of the 
20th Century, when it was carried into the range of 
international justice instruments that legitimize the 
link between the security discourse and national 
minorities, as exemplified in the ubiquitous 
references in these documents to the OSCE as well as 
in the work of the HCNM.15 Even if national 
minorities are not conflict prone but rather victims of 
other conflict prone groups, their existence has been 
cemented as a security issue rather than a question of 
integration of multinational states. Hence, the 
combined force of governments of national states and 
international organizations constitute the discourse in 
which security articulations are made and from which 
flows the view that minorities need to be controlled.   
However, the social reality of national minority 
existence does not necessarily evidence trigger happy 
minorities seeking to instigate ethnic conflict. 
Conflicts involving national minorities and ethnic 
groups are of course conflicts-involving-ethnic-
groups but they are not necessarily ‘ethnic conflicts.’ 
Rogers Brubaker explains this in terms of (1) 
organizations and (2) coding.16 First, the 
“representativeness” is often variable of 
organizations that allegedly represent national 
minorities or ethnic groups or the degree to which 
organizations can claim to represent the will, interest, 
and support of its constituents. Because of the lack of 
boundedness, coherence, static existence and 
collective agency of ethnic groups, organizations 
such as the IRA, the KLA and the PKK cannot claim 
to represent collectively and comprehensively all 
Catholic Irish, or all Kosovo Albanians, or all Kurds 
of Turkey, respectively. While one might be able to 
see entire minority groups as objects of conflict and 
violence, there is no logic connection to think of 
every member of a minority group as a subject of 
ethnic action in conflicts. The upshot of this analysis 
is that organizations not national minorities and 
ethnic groups stage conflict. 
The chief protagonists of conflicts involving 
national minorities and ethnic groups are various 
kinds of organizations and their empowered and 
authorized incumbents. Organizations include states 
and autonomous polities plus their agencies, terrorist 
groups paramilitary organizations, armed bands, 
ethnic associations, social movements, churches, 
newspapers, radio and television, etc. Such 
organizations are the principal actors in conflicts 
because they possess certain material and 
organizational resources that allow them to be 
capable of organized action. But they are not 
necessarily ethnic organizations. While they may 
become ethnicized in their strategies, ethnicity is not 
at the source of these strategies.17  
This mischaracterization of ethnicity is also a 
coding problem, according to Brubaker who explains 
that violence is often defined ex post not only by 
perpetrators and victims but also by politicians, 
officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers etc.18 
Violence is thus framed not in terms of inhumane 
behaviour but in terms of structural and cultural 
characteristics, such as ethnicity. The interpretive 
framing and narrative coding of violent acts thus 
becomes powerful feedback which in turn informs 
subsequent events. The bias of coding and framing is 
particular dangerous when analyst of conflict are not 
able to take this into account. In short, ‘ethnic 
conflict’ is a phenomenon of “composite and causally 
heterogeneous texture” which must be analyzed 
through disaggregation.19 The analysis of conflict 
must therefore differentiate between the national 
minority or ethnic group and its complexities, on the 
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one hand, and the organizations that claim to act on 
behalf of complex national or ethnic groups, on the 
other, because this relationship is deeply ambiguous.   
The justice discourse 
 
Since justice in Europe is primarily a post-World 
War II phenomenon linked not only to the rise of the 
UN system of peaceful states forming a club but also 
to the establishment of the inter-governmental co-
operation in the Council of Europe, justice in terms 
of human rights is seen as necessary to protect 
individual humans against the arbitrary power of the 
state. Thus, the justice discourse represents a binary 
relationship of rights and power. With regard to 
national minorities, one might call this discourse the 
protection discourse. The notion of protection has 
become specifically pronounced in relation to 
protecting members of minority groups. While 
minority rights were not included in the discourse 
immediately after World War II and the 
establishment of the UN human rights regime, the 
Council of Europe did articulate non-discrimination 
of national minorities as a new idea in the European 
Convention of Human Rights.20 Moreover, the events 
in the Balkans after 1989 induced the Council of 
Europe to expand the range of international legal 
instruments seeking to provide justice/protection for 
national minorities in Europe culminating in the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM).  
The protection approach was furthermore 
paralleled in the UN system by the Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and in the EU 
system by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While 
protection through justice is clearly an honourable 
goal, there should not be any doubt that like the 
security discourse, the justice discourse is a state-
centred discourse. One might even go as far as 
arguing that some of the legal instruments designed 
to protect national minorities against the arbitrary 
power of governments are disingenuous in that they 
promote state-centred policies against the overall aim 
of the instrument thus preventing it from fulfilling the 
goal of benefitting the beneficiaries.21  A dichotomy 
of state versus minority in both the security discourse 
and the justice discourse is therefore the true picture 
of the protection of national minority existence 
because the ultimate goal is not the survival of 
national minorities but the survival of the state.  
Thus, it should be no surprise that there has not 
been space for national minority narratives in the two 
discourses where national minority issues have 
traditionally been placed. National minority 
narratives seen from a political sociology perspective 
do not lend any support to the state-centred view of 
the two 20th Century discourses. In fact, any view of 
national minorities as pro-active actors and 
contributors to society and democracy would 
interfere with the main tenets of these discourses. For 
instance, the main tenet of modern international law 
sees national minorities as a threat to its structure 
because it threatens the hegemonic identity of state 
sovereignty.22 This is why it has been argued that the 
real problem of the FCNM is that ‘the assumptions 
upon which it was drafted are being challenged by 
the very existence of the beneficiaries that it is 
supposed to protect.’23 It follows that if the purpose 
of the FCNM is to protect members of national 
minorities, the instrument will not be able to reach its 
objective. As it is, focusing on protection seems 
rather minimalist, at least when it concerns national 
minorities.  
The main issue is empowerment versus 
protection. Empowerment leads to self-protection, 
and self-protection is the corollary of self-
determination.24 This is why it is important to 
understand that self-determination is more than 
empowerment in terms of self-government and power 
over territory and population. Self-determination is 
the self-protection of self-constituting communities, 
and self-constituting communities are precisely the 
reality of the national minority narratives that have 
emerged in Europe after 1945. However, many of 
these narratives have yet to be mapped out. This 
Issue Brief draws on a limited segment of data from 
one national minority region which is likely to be 
seen as further developed historically. But other 
research is emerging.25 Of course, the two notions are 
in a binary relation. The idea of convergence between 
rights protection and democratization policies, on the 
one hand, and European integration policies, on the 
other, is no longer foreign to minority research.26 In 
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fact, assessing the extent to which convergence is 
happening is dependent on the mapping of national 
minority narratives.   
So, alternative questions have to be asked. Is it 
possible to think of representatives of national 
minorities as intermediaries in conflict resolution 
processes or inter-cultural dialogues? Or, can we 
imagine national minorities taking pro-active action 
on regional development involving the border 
between two former enemy nations? These are the 
kind of questions political sociologists ask. In 
general, the notion that national minorities can 
contribute to state and nation building is foreign. 
Indeed, their competencies as citizens as well as 
taxpaying citizens often come as a surprise to policy 
makers.27 The remainder of this Issue Brief will focus 
on European integration discourses and how national 
minority narratives relate to these.    
New European discourses and 
national minority narratives 
 
It has been argued that the EU is the moral space 
within which to search for ethical models of national 
minority accommodation.28 Notwithstanding the 
adoption of the reformed Lisbon Treaty (2007), 29 this 
has not materialized. Nevertheless, the EU 
integration and Europeanization processes have given 
space to new discourses that will find it difficult to 
domesticate the national minority narratives the way 
the security and justice discourses have. These 
discourses include the cohesion discourse as well as 
the European citizenship discourse and the global 
environmental discourse. They have created spaces 
where national minority narratives can become 
relevant and speak to the current power struggles.  
The cohesion discourse  
 
The cohesion discourse in Europe forms around the 
EU’s territorial cohesion through regional policies 
that aim to bring European countries closer together 
economically and socially. Solidarity between 
member states is an important articulation of this 
discourse, and the concept of solidarity is clearly the 
binary value of cohesion. In addition to territorial 
cohesion, social cohesion and social unity are other 
specific articulations of this discourse.  
The cohesion discourse involves a complex 
matrix of institutions, policies and national agendas. 
It began forming in 1986 as a result of the Single 
European Act but consolidated around the EU’s 
Agenda 2000 which allowed for a fundamental 
reform of the EU’s regional policies and brought in 
new approaches in the light of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement waves. Currently, the EU’s Regional 
Policy is the Union's second largest budget item, with 
an allocation of EUR 348 billion for the budget 
period 2007-2013.30 For the period 2007-2013, 
economic and social cohesion is concentrating on 
crucial development concerns in the field of 
economic growth and employment while continuing 
to support regions which are facing specific structural 
problems (areas undergoing industrial restructuring, 
urban areas, rural areas, areas dependent on fishing, 
and areas suffering from natural or demographic 
handicaps).  
The Regional Policy has also begun to focus on 
important sub-regions, such as the Baltic Sea Region 
and the Danube Region thus indicating that the EU 
territory consists not only of several layers of policy 
making but also of several layers of development for 
growth. These regions are also called Regions for 
Economic Change, which refers to the idea that there 
is a need for a more coordinated approach to good 
practice exchange and more effective networking 
among regions in order to contribute to improving the 
quality of the Cohesion Policy. Specifically, the 
initiative is supposed to introduce new ways to 
dynamise regional and urban networks and test 
innovative ideas. Both the Baltic Sea Region and the 
Danube Region represent areas where national 
minorities have traditionally lived for centuries and 
where their networks may support inter-state 
cohesion because they span sovereign borders. 
Border regions are of particular concern because 
they are notoriously outer lying regions and often 
neglected in terms of national economic policies. In 
many of these regions, national minorities are at the 
forefront of this aim because they live near or on 
former sovereign borders and because they have 
accumulated experience with border management. 
Today, these minorities represent competencies to 
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intensify the aim of cohesion because they usually 
speak the languages of both the states separated by 
the border, they have bi-cultural and inter-cultural 
knowledge that is valuable to improving the 
networking and contacts across the former borders, 
and they are often more engaged in the preservation 
of the region than the average majority population. 
Unfortunately, the notion that national minorities can 
be motivated by solidarity towards both the national 
state and the kin-state and thus promote cohesion is 
seldom accepted.  
However, the narratives of the three national 
minorities in the Danish-German border region speak 
to this discourse. In a recent report it has been 
established that the national minorities in that region 
co-operate and participate in the aim to develop the 
border region towards greater economic investments 
and ultimately prosperity.31 The narrative is a story of 
co-operation across the border for many decades, but 
the co-operation intensified after 2001 when 
Denmark joined the Schengen Agreement signed in 
1985, and the sovereign border became open. Cross-
border co-operation (CBC) became a necessity rather 
than a desire. Not only did police CBC become a 
necessity but also business and labour market 
integration. Thus, eyeing a window of opportunity 
and driven by their hybrid identities, the national 
minorities began to put their cross-cultural 
knowledge and social capital to use in those sectors 
that needed CBC. For instance, cross-border 
ambulance services and an express bus have been 
established as a result of the minorities identifying 
opportunities. The hybrid streak in the identities of 
the national minorities thus met with the more 
instrumental creed of the local elite players. This 
“marriage” of otherwise antagonist players is unique 
in the sense that both have a vision about European 
and EU integration as a common good in so far that it 
benefits the border region.32  
The citizenship discourse  
 
The European citizenship discourse has formed over 
the last couple of decades and often takes its clues 
from the public debate on EU constitutionalism and 
the so-called ‘democratic deficit.’ The Maastricht 
Treaty is seen as the watershed that began the 
citizenship discourse. It aimed to address the problem 
of democratic deficit which put the EU on the path 
towards a constitution. The EU’s approach is civil 
society oriented and aims to overcome the gap 
between the EU and its citizens. Thus, it focuses 
heavily on activating citizens to become involved 
with a goal to overcome the democratic deficit. The 
binary value to citizenship in this discourse is 
participation. It is therefore not a normative 
discussion of citizenship rights and the legal 
ramifications for those who are not included in the 
EU polity because of being excluded from holding 
citizenship in one of the EU member states. Rather, it 
a discourse articulating ideas of action towards a 
shared identity.  
The EU provides various symbols (flag, anthem, 
Europe day, etc.) and a motto ‘Unity in Diversity’ to 
support the process of Europeanization towards a 
common identity. More recently, the Lisbon Treaty 
has enumerated the common values around which 
European as citizens can gather. However, scholars 
are rather more sceptical about the idea that 
Europeans can unite around a common identity. 
Rather than a common European identity based upon 
a common language, ecological sensibility, sense of 
history and shared culture, scholars argue that the 
new narratives of European citizenship represent the 
emergent European polity of how to protect and 
nurture a multiplicity of complex, overlapping, 
hybrid, national identities institutionally. Not only do 
policies based on the norm of cultivating citizenship 
in Europe now unfold within the context of a mosaic 
of robust and dynamic, actually existing civil 
societies that tend to intermingle as an emergent 
European civil society but this patchwork quilt of 
civil societies also comprises a multiplicity of 
identities of regional loyalties, gender, market 
position, sport, music and respect for the sacred that 
have the effect of challenging and de-centring 
national identity.33 Seen in this way, the project of 
European citizenship is attempting to detach 
nationality and citizenship.  
The space between the national legacy of 
citizenship and the post-national project is clearly 
becoming demarcated in the citizenship discourse. 
Most radically, it has been argued that citizenship 
should no longer be seen as a status of privileged 
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membership of a state and a nation, but instead as an 
institutional role enabling individuals' capacities to 
shape the context of their lives and promote the 
freedom and well-being of others.34 A European 
citizenship on this notion would be independent of 
any specific form of political organisation; rather, it 
would allow for a choice between different sorts of 
constitutional values for the EU itself.  
The idea of a national minority citizenship would 
clearly fit well into this notion of attachment to 
values rather than states. National minorities 
proclaim allegiance to nations representing certain 
values, not states representing certain ideals. 
Moreover, European citizenship is to be understood 
as a fluid identity that internalizes ongoing 
negotiations of particular differences, multiple 
identities and shared or common loyalties, as a new 
type of complex citizenship that guarantees citizens 
their ‘right to be different.’35 Such characteristics 
clearly exist in the identities of members of national 
minorities. The negotiation of dual loyalties, dual 
attachments and often dual responsibilities in national 
minority identities fosters the fluid outlook of 
identity. Detaching citizenship from the dogmatic 
state-centred view of social organization is thus the 
only outlook for a national minority citizenship.   
National minority narratives inform the European 
citizenship discourse seeking to incorporate 
articulations and narratives of acts and action about 
values. Forces of acts and action are bigger and wider 
than those generated by top-down ex post 
contributions to the integration of Europe. They are 
social and cultural trends towards the formation of a 
European civil society, a vast, dynamically inter-
connected and multi-layered European social space 
consisting of many thousands of non-governmental 
initiatives, networks, personalities, movements and 
organizations. This civil society comprises 
individuals, households, businesses, non-profit and 
non-governmental organizations, coalitions, 
conferences, social movements and cultural-religious 
groups. Their situated actions comprise the material 
from which civil society is made and in turn feeds the 
work of charities, lobby groups, citizens’ movements, 
independent media, trade unions and sporting 
bodies.36  
National minority narratives are stocked with 
volunteering and actions as civil society actors. In 
fact, national minorities are likely to accumulate 
more social and human capital than the average 
citizen due to the nature of national minority 
existence. Social capital and participation are thus the 
key words in the narratives that national minorities 
represent in terms of citizenship. Taking again the 
example of the narrative of the three national 
minorities in the Danish-German border region, the 
national minorities have exhibited citizenship skills, 
in particular in terms of drawing on their social and 
human capital when participating in local politics.37 
The human and social capital of the national 
minorities in the Danish-German border region is 
evidenced in the large self-administration of 
institutions, such as educational and social care 
facilities. The self-administration of such institutions 
alleviates the majority society from significant 
burdens in terms of both finances and structures, 
because the self-administration of those institutions 
would otherwise require public administration that 
was funded by the national government. Moreover, 
human capital is evidenced at the level of political 
participation both through the political parties and the 
corporate institutions. Their political participatory 
competence is a sign that they possess the human 
capital needed in a democratic society that wishes to 
encourage not only representation, but also 
participation.  
The environmental discourse  
 
In Europe the environmental discourse is rather 
disparate. At the global level, it became articulated in 
a discourse of global disaster through the so-called 
Rio Process which started in 1972. In the EU it is still 
a non-directional discourse where no member state or 
main actor is able to take the lead. A strategy has 
been devised in 2001, and the idea of Sustainable 
Development is now the mantra and a full EU 
strategy. The notion of sustainable development of 
the environment has been a global concern since the 
Bruntland Commission’s report (1987).38 It is 
difficult to determine what constitutes the binary 
value in the environmental discourse in Europe. 
Scholars distinguish between environmentalism, 
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meaning the need to protect the environment, and 
ecologism, meaning the idea that human beings 
construct their lives entirely around respect for non-
human species and accept a hierarchical relationship 
where humans are not on top.39 Much is done in 
Europe to turn Europeans into Green citizens and 
Green virtues are fostered to make Europeans protect 
the Earth for future generations. It could therefore be 
argued that the environmental discourse represents a 
binary relationship of planet and virtues.  
To national minorities who live traditionally in 
homelands from which they derive their identities, 
the environment is particularly important. This means 
that the protection of the environment is often 
intrinsically linked to the protection of the minority 
culture because the survival of the culture is 
dependent on the survival of the homeland, i.e. the 
region’s environment. The familiar minority 
narratives that speak to the environmental discourse 
are in fact not European. To the Zapatistas in Mexico, 
the destruction of the jungle for oil extraction and 
large-scale logging were some of the core issues that 
motivated their freedom movement. Native 
Americans in other parts of the Western hemisphere 
are known for a moral concern for the Earth that 
provides for more natural management of the 
environment than any environmental agency could 
muster.  
In Europe, the narratives of national minorities in 
Western Europe show increasing participation in the 
environmental sector. German minority farmers in 
Denmark have taken the lead in bringing Danish 
agriculture into the organic realm as well as in 
creating bio-energy. In Germany, an environmental 
wing of the Danish minority has created a grass-root 
organization following the “think globally, act 
locally” mantra of the new environmental 
movements. The North Frisian minority is directly 
involved in the protection of the islands off the west 
coast of Schleswig-Holstein. They participate in a 
Euro-region called the Euro-region Wadden Sea, 
which consists of a number of the islands off the west 
coast of Northwest Europe. The aim of this Euro-
region is the preservation of the biodiversity in the 
wading waters off the coast. Indeed, in Northern 
Italy, the German-speaking minority living in the 
Province of Bolzano in South Tyrol has installed 
green infrastructure on the skiing slopes. In fact, a 
member of the Green party in South Tyrol has 
proposed an entirely different type of minority, not 
defined by ethnicity or allegiance to a nation but by 
the biosphere that it inhabits, the Alps. In other 
words, in action and in ontology, the narratives of 
indigenous people and national minorities are defined 
along the lines of Green virtues and participation in 
environmental protection.  
Conclusions  
 
The notion that national minorities can promote 
rather than obstruct European integration has yet to 
be accepted in politics and explored fully in research. 
When new capacities emerge and new spaces for 
politics become defined national minorities are rarely 
seen as primary actors. The tendency in the 20th 
Century to trap national minority narratives in the 
security and justice discourses has not served them 
well. It seems that prejudiced outsider interpretations 
of national minorities have saddled them with 
negative articulations shaped by attitudes of 
European 19th Century Orientalism. The shift to a 
patronizing attitude at the end of the 20th Century has 
not improved much in terms of understanding 
national minority narratives. This Issue Brief has 
aimed to demonstrate that the case in point, the three 
national minorities in the Danish-German border 
region as well as other regions live narratives that 
defeat this sedimented view.  
The brief analysis provided of the integration 
discourses in Europe gives reason to believe that the 
view of national minorities as trouble makers is ready 
for revision. With national minorities evidencing 
collective action capacities in the democratic 
processes to reunite Europe peacefully through 
modernization and regional development, 
opportunities to see national minorities in a new light 
have emerged. Firstly, the cohesion discourse is 
being informed by national minority narratives of 
solidarity. Secondly, the citizenship discourse is 
being informed by national minority narratives of 
social capital and participation. Thirdly, the 
environmental discourse is being informed by 
national minority narratives of virtues, virtues of 
Green participation.  
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In short, the argument is that in the formation of a 
new European polity, there is reason to argue that 
national minorities are formidable actors and 
contributors because they evidence ability to show 
solidarity towards both the national state and the kin-
state, because they show ability to accumulate social 
capital needed in support of a European citizenship, 
and because they evidence virtues needed in the 
normative effort to protect our planet. Although a 
small scale sample, this Issue Brief has attempted to 
show that national minorities should be seen as a 
resource to society rather than a burden. 
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